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Surprisingly, the ruling party United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya) practically 
disappeared from the arena of public politics all of a sudden. The feeling of a 
mass of people exclusion was multiply enhanced by the public statement 
concerning exchange of chairs that had been made in advance by the ‘ruling 
tandem’: V.Putin will be president and D.Medvedev will be prime minister 
(what is really happened in May 2012). The people called this deal ‘tiny cas-
tling’. 
An All-Russian Popular Front was urgently set up in parallel with, or 
rather in substitution of, the ruling top that had been moved aside by the rul-
ers themselves. Putin, the acknowledged political leader of the country and 
its new president, headed it and delegated guidance of the ruling party to the 
ex-president D. Medvedev. And the longer the government was irresponsive 
to protestors’ demands, the more explicit and persistent the latter’s political 
demands became. The people came to understand that the state machine had 
fully alienated itself from civil society and lived by its own laws. 
Then, the idea of modernization in Russia had ‘suddenly’ faded 
away somehow and vanished from the front pages of newspapers and TV 
news programmes. The key figures of the Institute of Modern Development 
that had been specially set up to translate this idea into concrete programmes 
and projects of modernization likewise left the public arena. And judging 
from Putin’s pre-election promises what might be expected is just a conser-
vative project of Russia’s modernization (Yanitsky, 2011b). Eventually, 
elections to the VI State Duma (the parliament) held in December 2010, 
which civic organizations appraised as being falsified, topped off formation 
of the critical mass of protest [5; 6]. 
 
5. Models of the mass protest movement 
My further considerations are based on recent work of the US soci-
ologist K. Ash (2011) who analyzed models of protest movements in post-
communist countries. Ash states that in these countries civil society took on 
the role of a challenger to the power of the state and of an imperative for the 
functioning of a democracy. By creating non-state associations civic organi-
zations created the capability to confront and repel the forces of an intrusive 
state. Organizations evolved and built networks with one another, which 
then retained the capability of mobilizing and challenging the policies of a 
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government. This permitted opposition forces to organize and to demonstrate 
their strength during protest cycles (Tarrow, 1995: 54-61). 
Then, Ash distinguishes three modes of interpreting the emergence 
of these movements. The first, advanced most prominently by Valerie 
Bunce, Sharon Wolchik and Mark Beissinger, proposes that the color revolu-
tions spread through a process of diffusion from other successful movements 
in Europe and around the world. These scholars argue that seasoned organiz-
ers from successful movements collaborated with aspiring democratizers in 
unconverted countries to evangelize the ‘electoral model’, or non-violent 
protest against electoral fraud by an incumbent governmentficient in directly 
causing a successful revolution. Instead, scholars such as Lucan Way, attrib-
ute protest revolutions to a breakdown in authoritarian patronage and coer-
cion structures, saying that, ‘regimes with little coercive capacity…have had 
far more difficulty coping with even modest protest.’ Accordingly, it is evi-
dent that only regimes with large financial constraints were overthrown by a 
color revolution and relatively well-financed regimes held on to power and 
survived post-election challenges (Way, 2008). 
A third group of scholars, notes Ash, stress individual motives in 
participating in protests as fundamental to understanding electoral revolu-
tions. This direction can be traced back to analyses of the non-violent pro-
tests that brought about the fall of many communist governments in Eastern 
Europe in 1989. ‘Revolutionary bandwagoning’ was the most influential of 
the individualistic models to explain the rationale for protest. The model 
proposed that each individual in a country had a certain degree of discontent 
with the incumbent government. However, considering the threat of repres-
sion was strong under communism, these individuals had no incentive to dis-
sent unless they felt that their anti-communist principles trumped the conse-
quences of protest. 
All the above three interpretations are applicable, at least partially, to 
the period of mass protests under discussion. The general atmosphere of 
‘colour revolutions’ spreading, the ‘Arab Spring’ in the first place, played a 
mobilizing role here (Korotaev et al., 2011). The ‘Occupy Wall Street!’ 
movement that swept over the USA and EU also produced its effect. The 
second interpretation is true too because the regime has been repressive 
‘point-wise’, that is, only against those who in the opinion of the ruling elite 
posed a direct threat to the regime (like, for instance, the banned National-
Bolshevik party). As to the protest meetings, the authorities tried to hush 
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them up and even prohibit, but they sprang up over and over again. How-
ever, the third conception appears most adequate to the Russian situation.  
First, for the reason of forced introduction of market economy and 
propagation of liberal ideology Russian society have become highly indi-
vidualized in the last 20 years. Therefore, each individual citizen assesses the 
risk of his/her participation in each of the meetings independently. Second, 
the younger generation of protestors is the strangers to the fear that is still 
lurking in the minds of the older generation. Third, the emotional factor is a 
very strong driver. Russian sociologists seem to have so strong faith in the 
omnipotence of the market and its sociological derivatives, such as ratings, 
ranks and so on, that they come to forget about two more motives and at the 
same time resources of mass protest: moral and emotional. The politically 
engaged experts have got so much accustomed to converting any social act 
into roubles or dollars that they miss the driving force and impact of human 
emotions: resentment, indignation, and anger incurred by the unjust status of 
the majority of the population.  
Not only Russians are discontented though [7]. I think nobody might 
suspect me of calling for levelling but the slogans of today’s protestors in 
Russia and all over the world state clearly: one percent of the population has 
everything and the remaining 99 percent have what is left [8]. Does not what 
is happening today, 25 years after perestroika, mean the onset of a new wave 
of struggle for civil rights, but now on the scale of entire civil society? How-
ever it might be there have been no upheavals on such a scale and calls to 
fight for changes in the current social order over the past quarter of the cen-
tury. And virtual networks act as a powerful multiplier of the feelings of an-
ger and resentment. It became again clear that the principle of social justice 
is an indispensable prerequisite to the formation of a democratic system.  
 
6. Evolution of the protest movement 
Meeting as a mass congregation of people at the moment when some 
critical situation took shape has always occupied a special place in Russia’s 
historical and cultural tradition. In the official Soviet tradition, such event 
was a ‘demonstration’, that is, an organized procession of people [9]. Since 
the events discussed here unfolded in the capital city, the question of where a 
